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HOW GOD KNOWS COUNTERFACTUALS 
OF FREEDOM
Justin Mooney
One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which 
Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true coun-
terfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. 
I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle 
knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of 
divine knowledge.
1. Introduction
Molinists claim that there are true subjunctive conditionals about what 
any agent would freely do in any complete, indeterministic circum-
stances that agent could inhabit.1 To take a standard example, one such 
conditional might claim that, if Peter were in (complete, indeterminis-
tic) circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ. Conditionals of this 
sort are usually (if somewhat inaccurately2) called “counterfactuals of 
freedom.”
Molinists also claim that God knows all true counterfactuals of freedom 
infallibly and explanatorily prior to creating the world. So, even before cre-
ating anything, God knows infallibly that, if Peter were in circumstances 
C, he would deny Christ. For reasons that we need not go into here, this 
remarkable cognitive resource that the Molinist attributes to God goes by 
the moniker “middle knowledge.”
There are several standard objections to Molinism in the literature. For 
example, some critics of Molinism argue that counterfactuals of freedom 
cannot be true because there are no adequate ontological grounds for their 
applyparastyle "fig//caption/p[1]" parastyle "FigCapt"
applyparastyle "fig" parastyle "Figure"
1The requirement that the circumstances in the antecedent are complete is explained by 
Flint, Divine Providence, who advises Molinists to “think of the circumstances as including all 
of the prior causal activity of all agents along with all of the simultaneous causal activity by 
all agents other than the agent the counterfactual is about. Circumstances which are all-in-
clusive in this way will be said to be complete circumstances” (47).
2As other authors have observed (e.g., Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 26), some of 
these conditionals have true antecedents, and so are not technically counterfactual condi-
tionals. But I will continue to call them “counterfactuals of freedom,” as this terminology has 
been standard for decades now.
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truth.3 Some argue that, for semantic reasons, counterfactuals of freedom 
cannot be true explanatorily prior to creation.4 And some argue that cer-
tain Molinist commitments about counterfactuals of freedom threaten the 
free will of the subjects of those counterfactuals.5
But there are also critics of Molinism who think that, in addition to 
these well-trodden worries, Molinism faces a problem about the mech-
anism of God’s middle knowledge. They contend that there simply is 
no means by which God could know (infallibly and explanatorily prior 
to creating) which counterfactuals of freedom are true. Versions of this 
objection have been pressed by Timothy O’Connor,6 Katherin Rogers,7 
Richard Swinburne,8 Hugh McCann,9 and Alan Gehring.10 And contem-
porary Molinists, for their part, have done little to rebut this charge. As 
Perszyk observes, the Molinist response usually goes something like this: 
“If [counterfactuals of freedom] are true and God is omniscient, he knows 
them. Don’t ask how! He just does (innately or immediately)!’”11
My aim is to show that this worry is spurious; there is no problem 
about how God could know true counterfactuals of freedom that is inde-
pendent of the more familiar objections to Molinism.12 To show this, I will 
assume for the sake of argument that the more familiar objections fail, and 
moreover that the specific facets of Molinism which they attack are true. 
So, I will assume that there are true counterfactuals of freedom, that they 
are true explanatorily prior to creation, and that these and other standard 
Molinist claims are compatible with human freedom. And I  will argue 
3See Adams, “Middle Knowledge,” for an influential presentation of this objection.
4This worry was first voiced in Adams, “Middle Knowledge.”
5This sort of objection stems originally from Hasker, “A Refutation of Middle Knowledge.”
6O’Connor, “Impossibility.”
7Rogers, “Omniscience.”
8Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 256.
9McCann, “The Free Will Defence.” McCann takes his argument to be similar to 
O’Connor’s (“Impossibility”) and Zagzebski’s (The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, 
148–149). Zagzebski structures her argument as a dilemma for the view that middle knowl-
edge explains foreknowledge, rather than an argument against middle knowledge per se. 
McCann’s argument is similar to one horn of the dilemma.
10Gehring, Truthmaker Theory, 378–392. However, not all critics of Molinism press this 
issue. For example, by Hasker’s lights, “It is not clear that the friend of counterfactuals [of 
freedom] (or any other theist, for that matter) is required to explain how it is that God knows 
what he knows” (God, Time, and Knowledge, 29).
11“Recent Work on Molinism,” 761. In fairness, the early Molinists did try to explain 
the mechanism of middle knowledge. They proposed that God “supercomprehends” free 
agents. Whereas to comprehend an agent is to fully grasp its nature, to supercomprehend 
an agent is to have an even more perfect grasp of that agent which (somehow) affords God 
knowledge of what the agent would do in non-determining circumstances. As far as I know, 
this proposal has won no contemporary adherents, and it has been criticized even by prom-
inent advocates of middle knowledge. Flint complains that supercomprehension is “a rather 
murky and unhelpful concept” (Divine Providence, 56n26), and Freddoso concedes that this 
“account of how God has middle knowledge is arguably the weakest link in the Molinist 
chain” (“Introduction,” 52–53).
12Thanks to the editor for suggesting this way of framing the paper.
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that, given these assumptions, we can develop a plausible “mechanics of 
middle knowledge,” 13 i.e., a story about the mechanism by which God 
could know true counterfactuals of freedom (infallibly and explanatorily 
prior to creating).
2. A Mechanics of Middle Knowledge
If indeed some counterfactuals of freedom are true explanatorily prior 
to creation, then it turns out that a mechanics of middle knowledge can 
be derived from an independently motivated account of divine knowl-
edge in general. To see this, let’s begin with the general account of divine 
knowledge.
A few decades ago, William Alston proposed a direct acquaintance 
account of divine knowledge that, he contends, attributes the most exalted, 
perfect way of knowing to God.14 On Alston’s view, for every fact, F, God 
knows F by being directly acquainted with (aware of) F. The acquaintance 
relation in question is direct in the sense that it is unmediated. There is 
nothing “between” God and the facts God is acquainted with—not even 
representational mental states, such as beliefs, that represent the facts of 
God’s acquaintance. Instead, for God, facts themselves are “directly pres-
ent to consciousness.”15
An analogy may help.16 Consider an unembodied Cartesian ego intro-
specting on its own thought life. I take it that there is some kind of direct 
awareness or acquaintance relation holding between the ego and its own 
occurrent thoughts. This relation seems to be direct in the sense of being 
unmediated, and also knowledge-conferring, for it affords the ego knowl-
edge of its own thoughts. Now, perhaps a subject can only stand in this 
particular relation to mental entities, or more narrowly still, to the con-
tents of her own mind. But I take it that Alston is hypothesizing a different 
13I introduced the term “mechanics of middle knowledge” in Mooney, “Does Molinism 
Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?” It is inspired by the term “mechanics of foreknowl-
edge,” which is used heavily in recent work by Byerly (e.g., in “God Knows the Future” and 
The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge), who cites Viney (“God Only Knows?”) as its source. 
Byerly lists Molinism, theological determinism, Kvanvig’s epistemic conditionals view (in 
Destiny and Deliberation, ch. 8), and his own time-ordering view as accounts of the mechanics 
of foreknowledge. I would add Zagzebski’s hyperspace view (The Dilemma of Freedom and 
Foreknowledge, 172–179) and the acquaintance models in Alston (“Does God Have Beliefs?”) 
and Dickinson (“God Knows”).
14Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” For other acquaintance models of divine knowl-
edge, see Dickinson, “God Knows,” and Knowles, “God’s Mathematical Beliefs.” I think the 
mechanics of middle knowledge I develop below could be constructed using Dickinson’s 
and Knowles’s views instead of Alston’s, but I  won’t pursue that project here. For other 
accounts of how God knows every fact, see Mavrodes, “How Does God Know the Things He 
Knows?” and Brenner, “How Does God Know that 2 + 2 = 4?”
15This phrase is H. H. Price’s, as quoted by Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?,” 294.
16Thanks to Dan Dake for helping me to see the plausibility of proposals like Alston’s, and 
for helpful discussion of the material in this section and the next, particularly the Cartesian 
ego analogy.
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relation, one which is analogous to this one in that it is an unmediated, 
knowledge-conferring acquaintance relation, but disanalogous in that a 
subject—or at least a divine subject—can stand in this relation to any fact 
whatsoever, including facts about both the physical and the mental, the 
concrete and the abstract.
Maybe we do not have a firm grasp on the intrinsic nature of this rela-
tion that Alston is proposing, or on what it would be like to stand in that 
relation to certain facts (or to any fact at all), but that should not be worri-
some. For if—perhaps per impossibile—we never stood in the direct aware-
ness relation that we in fact stand in to our own thoughts, we would have 
no firm grasp on the intrinsic nature of that relation, or what it would 
be like to stand in that relation. So, since we are not divine subjects, we 
should not be surprised to find ourselves similarly in the dark about God’s 
epistemic access to the world.17
Suppose that Alston is right that God is directly acquainted with every 
fact. A natural next question is: what exactly is a fact? I propose that facts 
are the entities that Armstrong calls states of affairs.18 Thus, facts are 
instantiations of properties by objects. Combining the Alstonian account 
of divine knowledge with this Armstrongian position generates the view 
that God is directly acquainted with every case of some object instantiat-
ing some property. This means that we can give an account of how God 
knows true counterfactuals of freedom if we can identify some instanti-
ations of properties by objects such that God’s being directly acquainted 
with those instantiations is sufficient for God to know true counterfactuals 
of freedom.
One way to do this is to look for facts which would ground true coun-
terfactuals of freedom. For example, suppose it’s true that, if subject S 
were in circumstances C, S would freely perform action A. According to 
Robert Adams, Suárez suggested a view which entails that this counter-
factual of freedom is true in virtue of S’s having the property of being such 
that, if S were in C, S would freely do A.19 A variant of this view might claim 
that the world has this property.20 Then, by the direct acquaintance model 
of divine knowledge, God is directly acquainted with this instantiation. 
And just as I can know that the proposition there are hippos is true by being 
acquainted in perceptual experience with hippos, it seems that God can 
know that a counterfactual is true by being acquainted with the fact that 
grounds its being true.21
17Gehring, Truthmaker Theory, 390–392, makes these points about knowing what it is like 
to know in the way that God knows.
18Armstrong, States of Affairs. Dickinson (“God Knows”) also construes facts as states of 
affairs in his acquaintance model of divine knowledge.
19Adams, “Middle Knowledge.”
20Merricks, Truth and Ontology, considers and rejects proposals like this about various 
truths that he argues are ungrounded.
21O’Connor, “Impossibility,” claims that God knows contingent propositions by being 
acquainted with the facts that ground their truth.
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But Suárez’s proposal has not proved popular, and, more generally, 
many contemporary Molinists and anti-Molinists alike deny that coun-
terfactuals of freedom have grounds, whether or not they are true. So, 
it would be much better if we could formulate a mechanics of middle 
knowledge that didn’t require such grounds. The key to developing such 
an account is to propose that God is directly acquainted with the truth 
of counterfactuals of freedom themselves, rather than merely with their 
grounds.22 Alston’s direct acquaintance model of divine knowledge, when 
paired with the Armstrongian account of facts, gives us the material we 
need to develop this suggestion.
What exactly are true counterfactuals of freedom on the Molinist view? 
Evidently, they are truth-bearing entities that can be objects of knowledge 
and that exist explanatorily prior to creation. This suggests that they are 
either abstract propositions, or something else which can play the same 
theoretical role as abstract propositions, such as divine thoughts.23 And 
since truth is a property, these propositions or proposition-like entities 
have the property being true.24
Molinists may not all agree about the nature of the property being true. 
Those who think that true counterfactuals of freedom have grounds may 
want to say either that the property being true is a relation (e.g., a corre-
spondence relation) between propositions and the facts that ground them, 
or that it is a property that propositions have in virtue of standing in some 
relation to the facts that ground them. But obviously Molinists who deny 
that true counterfactuals of freedom have grounds will not think of the 
property being true in either of these ways. Merricks, for example, explic-
itly disavows these views.25 He argues that truth is a primitive extrinsic 
(but monadic) property. Since truth is extrinsic, whether a proposition is 
true depends on more than the proposition itself; it depends on the world. 
But for Merricks, that dependence is a matter of truth’s extrinsicality 
alone, and not of truth’s being or depending on some relation—such as a 
correspondence relation—between propositions and things in the world.
Regardless of what the Molinist thinks about the nature of the property 
being true, a proposition’s instantiating that property qualifies as a fact in 
the Armstrongian sense; it is an instantiation of a property by an object. 
So, by Alston’s model of divine knowledge, it will be a fact with which 
22Though I’ve never seen them in print, I’ve occasionally encountered nascent ideas that 
seem to be pointing in the direction of the model I sketch here. For example, I’ve seen the 
suggestion that God knows true counterfactuals of freedom by some kind of epistemic con-
tact with the propositions themselves. And William Lane Craig suggests in an interview 
(“How Could God Know the Future?”) that God might know the future by having quasi-per-
ceptual contact with propositions” instantiating truth values.
23On the view that propositions are divine thoughts, see Morris and Menzel, “Absolute 
Creation”; Gould and Davis, “Modified Theistic Activism”; Welty, “Theistic Conceptual 
Realism”; and Keller, “The Argument from Intentionality.”
24I take it for granted that there is such a property as truth. Deflationary views of truth 
which reject this assumption are beyond the scope of this paper.
25Merricks, Truth and Ontology.
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God is directly acquainted. Moreover, just as my direct acquaintance with 
facts about what is going on in my own mind is sufficient for my knowing 
those facts, so God’s direct acquaintance with the fact that a counterfactual 
of freedom is true is sufficient for God to know the fact that that counter-
factual of freedom is true.
This strikes me as a straightforward and at least prima facie unproblem-
atic account of how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom. Moreover, 
it is a consequence of three theses, all of which have been defended for 
independent reasons: (i) God is directly acquainted with every fact; (ii) 
facts are instantiations of properties by objects; and (iii) some counter-
factuals of freedom instantiate being true (explanatorily prior to creation).
3. An Objection
Here is an objection which some readers might find tempting. One might 
worry that God’s acquaintance with the fact that a counterfactual of free-
dom is true runs afoul of the traditional dogma that abstract objects such 
as propositions do not stand in causal relations. For one might think that, 
properly interpreted, this traditional commitment is incompatible with 
anything standing in a causal relation to the fact that a proposition is true. 
And one might also think that God can be acquainted with the fact that a 
proposition is true only if God is causally related to that fact.
The first thing to say here is that the problem doesn’t even get off the 
ground for those who reject the traditional claim that abstract objects are 
causally inert. Nor does it get off the ground for those who construe prop-
ositions as divine thoughts, and so as concrete rather than abstract objects. 
Nor for those whose views supply suitable proxies for true propositions. 
For example, even if divine thoughts are not identical to the things we 
normally call propositions, God might still have a thought corresponding 
to each proposition, and those that correspond to true propositions will 
instantiate being true.26 Then God could know true counterfactuals of free-
dom by being acquainted with the truth of God’s own thoughts.27
But suppose we set these suggestions aside. Even granting that prop-
ositions are abstract, that abstract objects are causally inert, and that (for 
some reason) neither divine thoughts nor anything else could serve as a 
suitable proxy for propositions, it is not obvious that there is a problem 
here. For God’s acquaintance with the fact that a proposition is true does 
not obviously imply that God is causally related to that fact.
Again, the Cartesian ego case is helpful. The direct acquaintance rela-
tion between a Cartesian ego and its thoughts is not a causal relation, nor 
does it seem to depend on one. You might think that the occurrence of any 
26By “thought” I do not mean “belief,” for obviously God does not believe every proposi-
tion, since God does not believe false propositions. This point is made by Morris and Menzel, 
“Absolute Creation.”
27Dickinson, “God Knows,” suggests something very similar about God’s knowledge of 
non-present facts.
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conscious thought T in the ego’s mental life causes the ego to be acquainted 
with T. But although I grant that the ego is acquainted with T because T 
occurs in the ego’s conscious mental life, I  think that this “because” is 
tracking a grounding relation rather than a causal relation. After all, you 
couldn’t sever the connection between these facts by tampering with the 
laws of nature as you can with an ordinary causal connection. It is met-
aphysically necessary that, if a conscious thought occurs to a mind, then 
that mind is acquainted with that thought. That’s a reason to think this is 
a case of grounding rather than a case of causation.
Similarly, for any fact, F, it is metaphysically necessary that, if F obtains, 
then God is acquainted with F. So, while it is true that God is acquainted 
with F because F obtains, it’s plausible that this “because” is tracking a 
grounding relation rather than a causal relation.
At this point, the critic might revise her objection and claim that God’s 
acquaintance with the truth of a proposition entails, not that the truth of the 
proposition itself stands in causal relations, but that God’s acquaintance with 
the truth of the proposition stands in causal relations. For just as our knowledge 
causally influences our choices, God’s acquaintance with the truth of various 
propositions will causally influence God’s volitions.28 And one might worry that 
this violates the traditional commitment that abstract objects are causally inert.
This revised version of the objection is not very promising. For one 
thing, some theists argue that divine agency is entirely non-causal in 
nature.29 But even if it isn’t, it is not obvious that the fact in question could 
not causally influence divine volitions. After all, even we mortals—or at 
least those of us who know that there are such things as propositions—are 
aware that some propositions instantiate the property being true (though 
of course this awareness is not direct in the way that God’s is). And this 
awareness seems to causally influence our actions and other mental states.
For example, consider using simple mathematical truths to calculate more 
complex ones. Via calculations like these, it seems that my awareness that cer-
tain mathematical propositions instantiate being true can cause me to become 
aware that certain more complex mathematical propositions also instantiate 
being true. Now, this causal influence either entails that propositions them-
selves are in some way causally related to the world, or it doesn’t. If it does, 
then the traditional dogma that abstract objects are causally inert is false. If it 
doesn’t, then an agent can be causally influenced by the fact that the agent is 
aware of a proposition’s truth without violating the traditional dogma.30
28That God’s knowledge of true counterfactuals of freedom influences God’s creative 
volition(s) is, in fact, a commitment of Molinism.
29Pearce, “Foundational Grounding.”
30A referee raises another worry. Given the standard semantics for counterfactuals in 
terms of closeness relations between possible worlds, God could know counterfactuals of 
freedom about non-actual agents only by being able to discern which of multiple qualita-
tively indiscernible worlds are closest to the actual world. This would require that God has 
epistemic access either to non-qualitative differences between worlds, or to brute differences 
between them. Both of those options seem implausible.
227HOW GOD KNOWS COUNTERFACTUALS OF FREEDOM
4. Responding to Some Anti-Molinist Arguments
So, it seems to me that God could know true counterfactuals of freedom infal-
libly and explanatorily prior to creating by being directly acquainted with the 
facts which consist in those counterfactuals instantiating the property being 
true. And we have seen that this mechanics of middle knowledge follows 
from theses that have been defended by others on independent grounds.
With this mechanics of middle knowledge in hand, we can now see why 
certain anti-Molinist arguments in the literature—those which claim that 
there is no mechanism by which God could know true counterfactuals of 
freedom infallibly and explanatorily prior to creating—are unsuccessful.
For example, Timothy O’Connor avers that, if God knows true coun-
terfactuals of freedom infallibly and explanatorily prior to creating, then 
God must be directly acquainted with the grounds of those counterfactu-
als. But since counterfactuals of freedom lack such grounds, God does not 
know them.31 O’Connor seems to overlook the possibility that God might 
know true counterfactuals of freedom by being directly acquainted with 
the truth of those counterfactuals themselves.
Katherin Rogers and Richard Swinburne (independently) contend that, 
if God knows true counterfactuals of freedom infallibly and explanatorily 
prior to creating, then the agents and/or actions involved in those coun-
terfactuals are causally linked to relevant divine mental states. But those 
agents and/or actions are not causally linked to relevant divine mental 
states, since they don’t exist at all. So, God does not know true counter-
factuals of freedom infallibly and explanatorily prior to creating.32 But 
like O’Connor, Rogers and Swinburne seem to overlook the possibility 
that God might know true counterfactuals of freedom by being directly 
acquainted with the truth of those counterfactuals themselves, rather than 
by being causally linked to the agents and/or actions that they are about.
But I don’t see why we should accept the referee’s claim that God could know the rel-
evant counterfactuals only by discerning certain closeness relations between worlds. On 
the model I have sketched, God knows true counterfactuals by being acquainted with their 
instantiations of being true, not by being acquainted with closeness relations between worlds; 
and God’s acquaintance with these facts is direct, rather than being mediated by closeness 
relations between worlds or anything else. And all of this seems perfectly coherent. Apart 
from some independent reason to think that this model fails, we are in no position to claim 
that God could know the relevant counterfactuals only by discerning certain closeness rela-
tions between worlds.
Maybe the referee’s thought is that God can be acquainted with the truth of the relevant 
counterfactuals only if they are true, and they are true only if closeness relations between 
worlds are sensitive to non-qualitative or brute facts, which is implausible. But this objection 
only threatens God’s knowledge of the relevant counterfactuals by way of threatening the 
truth of those counterfactuals, and therefore it falls outside the scope of my project. For recall 
that my aim is to argue that God can know the relevant counterfactuals given certain assump-
tions, one of which is that the relevant counterfactuals are indeed true.
31O’Connor, “Impossibility.”
32Rogers, “Omniscience.” Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 256. Cf. Baras, “A 
Reliability Challenge.”
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Taking a slightly different approach, Hugh McCann argues that God 
lacks adequate evidence about which counterfactuals of freedom are true 
explanatorily prior to creating.33 But it seems clear that a subject who is 
directly acquainted with a fact thereby knows that fact. Maybe this means 
that direct acquaintance with a fact is a way of knowing a fact without evi-
dence. Or maybe it means that a subject who is directly acquainted with a 
fact thereby has evidence for that fact (e.g., perhaps the fact is self-evident 
for any such subject). Either way, the mechanics of middle knowledge 
sketched above seems to undermine McCann’s argument.
Finally, Alan Gehring canvasses a variety of possible mechanisms of 
middle knowledge and criticizes each of them.34 But he does not consider 
the possibility that God might be directly acquainted with the truth of true 
counterfactuals of freedom. So, his argument is not successful either.
In short, arguments that there is no mechanism by which God could 
know true counterfactuals of freedom fail because they overlook the plau-
sible suggestion that God is directly acquainted with the truth of the rel-
evant counterfactuals. I conclude that Molinists face no serious problem 
about the mechanism of middle knowledge over and above the standard 
objections to their view.35
University of Massachusetts Amherst
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